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of-use#LAAWhen the Perpetrator Becomes a 
Reliable Witness of the Holocaust: 
On Jonathan Littellﾒ’s Les bienveillantes
Susan Rubin Suleiman
Victims of the Holocaust have for a long time fascinated historians, psycholo-
gists, and novelists, as well as the general public; many victims themselves 
have published testimonies or autobiographical   ctions, attesting to the ongo-
ing interest in the experience of those who suffered at the hands of the Nazis. 
Perpetratorsﾒ’ testimonies, however, are virtually nonexistent; that of Rudolf 
Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, who wrote his ﾓ“memoirsﾔ” in prison 
before being executed, is a rare exception. Anyone curious about the actions 
and motivations of those who willingly participated in the Nazi project of mass 
murder has had to rely on historians and philosophers such as Raul Hilberg, 
Hannah Arendt, Christopher Browning, and Daniel Goldhagen.
Fictional representations of the inner world of perpetrators (as opposed 
to the standard external view of Nazi villains in countless   lms) are also hard 
to   nd. Robert Merleﾒ’s novel La mort est mon métier (Death Is My Trade, 
1952), a   ctionalized version of Hössﾒ’s autobiography, was until recently the 
only full-length novel narrated in the voice of a Nazi perpetrator. Jorge Luis 
Borgesﾒ’s short story ﾓ“Ein Deutsches Requiemﾔ” (ﾓ“A German Requiem,ﾔ” 1949) is 
the unrepentant monologue of a Nazi of  cer about to be executed, and George 
Steiner concludes his novel The Portage to San Cristobal of A. H. (1981) with 
a   rst-person self-justi  catory rant by Adolf Hitler himself. David Grossmanﾒ’s 
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novel See Under: Love (1989) devotes some brilliant pages to the inner life 
of the camp commandant Neigel, obviously modeled on Treblinkaﾒ’s real-life 
commandant, Franz Stangl; Martin Amisﾒ’s novel Timeﾒ’s Arrow (1991) is the 
postwar narrative of a Nazi doctor, but told in reverse order, as if to deny not 
only what happened but also any sense of responsibility on the part of the 
protagonist-narrator. A few   ction   lms have also attempted to suggest, if 
not downright represent, the subjectivity of perpetrators. One thinks of the 
ﾓ“mirror-sceneﾔ” depicting the sadistic camp commander Amon Goeth in a 
moment of self-doubt in Steven Spielbergﾒ’s   lm Schindlerﾒ’s List (1993), or of 
Oliver Hirschbiegelﾒ’s more extended recent attempt to portray Joseph Goeb-
bels and Hitler as full-  edged characters in Der Untergang (Downfall, 2004), 
but again, these are exceptions rather than the rule.
One can understand the reluctance of serious   ction writers to portray 
a Nazi perpetratorﾒ’s inner life. The extended representation of a characterﾒ’s 
subjectivityﾗ—not only actions but feelings, perceptions, opinions, and way of 
being in the worldﾗ—necessarily requires a degree of empathy, on the part of 
both author and reader; even if the character is loathsome, he or she must at 
least be recognized as human, hence sharing some characteristics with the 
rest of us. But empathy for a perpetrator of genocideﾗ—even if it coexists with 
revulsion and moral condemnationﾗ—puts both author and reader on uncom-
fortable ethical ground, and on uncomfortable aesthetic ground as well. How 
might one portray a Nazi murderer as the protagonist of a novel, at once rec-
ognizably human, or even familiar, and morally inexcusable? Should such a 
protagonist be allowed the privilege of the narrative voice, given the almost 
automatic call to empathy that accompanies   rst-person narrative? On the 
other hand, how could one possibly adopt the voice of an ﾓ“omniscientﾔ” nar-
rator in exploring the behavior and perceptions of such a protagonist? These 
are merely the   rst and most obvious aesthetic questions that confront any 
writer hardy enough (or reckless enough) to undertake the enterprise of por-
traying a perpetrator of the Holocaust ﾓ“from within.ﾔ”1
These questions lead me directly to Jonathan Littellﾒ’s nine-hundred-
page novel, Les bienveillantes (The Kindly Ones), published in France in 
September 2006 and soon to appear in English.2 Purporting to be the   rst-
1. I have in mind, of course, a serious writer with a sense of integrity; the garbage that may 
appear on negationist Web sitesﾗ—if indeed the latter carry pieces of   ction that admit to being 
  ctionﾗ—would be a totally different object of study.
2. Jonathan Littell, Les bienveillantes (Paris: Gallimard, 2006). Hereafter cited by page num-
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person narrative of a former SS of  cer writing many years after World War II, 
Les bienveillantes became the biggest best seller of the year and won the most 
prestigious French literary prize, the Prix Goncourt, as well as the Grand Prix 
of the French Academy.3 The author, a thirty-eight-year-old American who 
had lived in France for a good part of his childhood and adolescence, wrote 
the book in French. (His father, Robert Littell, is a best-selling writer of detec-
tive novels.) Its critical reception in France, as elsewhere, has been sharply 
divided, notably in Germany, where it appeared in spring 2008 to wildly 
mixed reviews, as reported by Klaus Theweleit in this issue of New German 
Critique: some readers   nd the book brilliant, while others excoriate it. Two 
ﾓ“total ravesﾔ” in the weekly Le nouvel observateur (by Jérôme Garcin and 
Dominique Fernandez), published right when the book appeared, both com-
pared Littell to Leo Tolstoy, among other literary giants; a few weeks later, 
in the same magazine, Claude Lanzmann paid the novel a grudging compli-
ment as far as historical accuracy was concerned but then condemned it 
for its lack of verisimilitude, its sensationalist ﾓ“fascination with horror,ﾔ” and 
other literary sins.4 Many others weighed in as well, with equally divergent 
opinions: the book critic Samuel Blumenfeld, writing in Le monde, compared 
Littell to Tolstoy, Boris Pasternak, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky; the historian 
Peter Schöttler (who is German), also writing in Le monde, dismissed Lit-
tellﾒ’s novel as devoid of historical verisimilitude, a sensationalist exploitation 
that reduces ﾓ“the complex phenomenon of the Shoahﾔ” to sadism and perver-
sion.5 Adding a touch of silliness to the negative critiques, the academician 
Marc Fumaroli decreed that Littellﾒ’s sin was not recognizing what ﾓ“naturally 
belongsﾔ” to French literature: ﾓ“He transports into our language an epic and 
apocalyptic category of the imagination that is not natural to us, but that is 
natural to the Americans.ﾔ”6 Meanwhile, on the Internet, bloggers discussed a 
book titled Les malveillantes (The Unkindly Ones), which came out a couple 
of months after Littellﾒ’s book and purported to show all that was wrong with it. 
The general feeling among bloggers was that the author of this work, a certain 
3. According to news accounts, the book sold 170,000 copies during the   rst month after pub-
lication; after the prizes, total sales went up to over 600,000.
4. Jérôme Garcin, ﾓ“Littell est grand,ﾔ” Le nouvel observateur, August 24ﾖ–30, 2006, 48ﾖ–51; 
Dominique Fernandez, ﾓ“Un nouveau Guerre et Paix,ﾔ” Le nouvel observateur, August 24ﾖ–30, 2006, 
51; Claude Lanzmann, ﾓ“Lanzmann juge Les Bienveillantes,ﾔ” Le nouvel observateur, September 
21ﾖ–27, 2006, 14.
5. Samuel Blumenfeld, ﾓ“Frères humains . . . ,ﾔ” Le monde, September 1, 2006; Peter Schöttler, 
ﾓ“Tom Ripley au pays de la Shoah,ﾔ” Le monde, October 14, 2006.
6. Marc Fumaroli, ﾓ“Une tout autre ﾑ‘exception française,ﾒ’ﾔ” Le monde, October 27, 2006.4    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
Paul-Eric Blanrue, was suffering from sour grapes and trying to cash in on 
another manﾒ’s success.7
A huge commercial success, then, and a huge artistic success as well, 
according to some; a piece of overblown American kitsch, according to oth-
ers.8 I count myself among the bookﾒ’s admirers. While it has some problematic 
aspects, it is, I believe, an extraordinarily interesting and original work. What 
makes it so? As all of its critics, both positive and negative, recognized, the 
novelﾒ’s most outstanding feature (other than its length) is that the story is told, 
retrospectively, by a   rst-person narrator who was a young, highly placed SS 
of  cer, not to mention an intellectual and a doctor of jurisprudence, bilingual 
in French and German, who escaped from Berlin to France at the end of the 
war and has been living there under an assumed identity ever since.9 Further-
more, he announces from the outset that he ﾓ“regrets nothingﾔ” and that his 
account is not going to be a hypocritical expression of repentance (12ﾖ–13). 
His opening sentence, with its allusion to François Villonﾒ’s ﾓ“Le Testamentﾔ”ﾗ—
ﾓ“Frères humains, laissez-moi vous raconter comment ça sﾒ’est passéﾔ” (Brother 
humans, let me tell you how it happened) (11)ﾗ—indicates both his love of 
French literature and one of his ongoing themes: he and the Nazis were not 
outside ﾓ“the humanﾔ” but within it. Under different circumstances, his read-
ers could well have done what he did: ﾓ“Allons, puisque je vous dis que je suis 
comme vousﾔ” (Go on, since I tell you that I am like you), is how he ends his 
introductory chapter (30).
The question is, what do we make of this? Is Maximilien Aue a Nazi 
out of some third-rate Hollywood   lm, mouthing the usual rationalizations 
and justi  cations (ﾓ“You too could have done what I didﾔ”), while Littell uses 
7. See the Web site buzz.litteraire.free.fr. The number of blog entries on Littellﾒ’s novel is 
extraordinary, from those of ﾓ“ordinaryﾔ” readers (one blogger who identi  es herself as a young 
woman and teacher kept a running diary of her reading of the novel over a period of several months: 
www.lalettrine.com) to those of professionals like the writer Pierre Assouline, who publishes a 
daily blog for Le monde (passouline.blog.lemonde.fr). A sampling of blogs suggests that the great 
majority of ﾓ“internautesﾔ” are enthusiastic about the book.
8. Among the positives, the March 2007 issue of Le débat, whose editor in chief is Pierre Nora, one 
of the bookﾒ’s great admirers (and an editor at Gallimard, the bookﾒ’s publisher), contains several excel-
lent articles as well as two long interviews with Littell; this issue appeared after I had written most of 
the present essay, and I am pleased to note that the contributors share some of my own views.
9. It is left ambiguous exactly when the narratorﾗ—who we learn was born in 1913ﾗ—is writing 
this ﾓ“memoir.ﾔ” He states in his introduction that he is still professionally active at the time of writ-
ing as the head of a lace factory in northern France, which suggests that he cannot be writing 
ﾓ“now,ﾔ” after 2000. He refers to the work of Raul Hilberg, whose book The Destruction of the Euro-
pean Jews   rst appeared in 1961 but became more widely known only in the 1980s. This could 
place the time of writing between the 1960s and the 1980s.Susan Rubin Suleiman    5
him to indulge in sensationalist descriptions of horror?10 I forgot to mention 
that Aue was, in his youth, the incestuous lover of his twin sister, as well as a 
homosexual with a ﾓ“perverseﾔ” imagination and a matricide! Or is Littell doing 
something really new and important here, something that deserves careful 
consideration and discussion?
Littell has stated that he began with the idea of inventing an ex-Nazi as 
his narrator because ﾓ“perpetrators never speak. Silence is their essence.ﾔ”11 This 
is not literally true as concerns the Holocaust, because there do exist a few 
memoirs or reminiscences by former Nazis.12 But Littell is right in a broader 
sense: we have never yet seen a comprehensive account of Nazi atrocities dur-
ing World War II that is told entirely from the perspective, and in the voice, of 
a perpetrator. Littellﾒ’s Aue has qualities that only a   ctional character can have: 
he is present, as an observing participant, in just about every place where the 
worst crimes against humanity were committed; he has access to privileged 
information available only to the inner circle around the SS leader Heinrich 
Himmler; and most important, he possesses the intelligence and analytic abil-
ity, the emotional detachment and temporal distance, as well as a certain moral 
sensibility, to act as a reliable historical witness. The combination of par-
ticipant status as a perpetrator with historical reliability, and with what I call 
moral witnessing, which Aue possesses, is a new phenomenon in   ction. The 
more intelligent of the negative critiques emphasize that this combination is 
implausible according to realist criteria, and problematic in other ways as well. 
Indeed, whether one admires Les bienveillantes or loathes it depends largely 
on how one responds to the improbable combination of perpetrator and reli-
able witness that Aue represents. I will therefore focus on that question, then 
raise what I consider a problematic aspect of Littellﾒ’s novel.
The Perpetrator as Reliable Historical Witness
Les bienveillantes consists of seven unnumbered chapters of varying lengths, 
whose titles correspond to the movements of a baroque dance suite: ﾓ“Toccata,ﾔ” 
10. For a typical negative judgment of this sort, see Jean Clair, ﾓ“Une apocalypse kitsch,ﾔ” Com-
mentaire, February 2007, 1106ﾖ–7. Clair, like several other negative critics, indulges in some fairly 
obvious anti-American rhetoric.
11. Reported by Garcin, ﾓ“Littell est grand,ﾔ” 50. Littell made this observation in other interviews 
as well, for example, in one with Samuel Blumenfeld, ﾓ“Jonathan Littell: ﾑ‘La parole vraie dﾒ’un bour-
reau nﾒ’existe pas,ﾒ’ﾔ” Le monde, September 1, 2006.
12. Besides Hössﾒ’s book, we have Franz Stanglﾒ’s reminiscences as told to Gitta Sereny, in her 
remarkable book Into That Darkness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), and Albert Speerﾒ’s mem-
oirs and diaries.6    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
ﾓ“Allemandes,ﾔ” ﾓ“Courante,ﾔ” ﾓ“Sarabande,ﾔ” ﾓ“Menuet,ﾔ” ﾓ“Air,ﾔ” and ﾓ“Gigue.ﾔ”13 This 
may be a reference to the narratorﾒ’s declared love of François Couperin and 
Jean-Philippe Rameau, but it also evokes Louis-Ferdinand Célineﾒ’s Rigodon, 
which similarly uses a dance metaphor to describe the madness of World 
War II. The two longest sections, ironically titled ﾓ“Allemandesﾔ” and ﾓ“Menuetﾔ” 
(slow and stately dances), constitute the novelﾒ’s historical and moral center and 
are also the ones that deal most explicitly and in great detail with the Holo-
caust. ﾓ“Allemandes I et II,ﾔ” the nearly three-hundred-page chapter that imme-
diately follows the introductory ﾓ“Toccata,ﾔ” focuses on the mass killings of 
Jews in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the Soviet Union between the German 
invasion of June 1941 and the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943. 
ﾓ“Menuet (en rondeaux),ﾔ” the three-hundred-page   fth chapter, offers a detailed 
account of the extermination camps in Poland, as observed by the narrator 
roughly between the spring of 1943, when he   rst visits Sobibor, Auschwitz, 
and other camps, to the ﾓ“death marchesﾔ” that preceded the Soviet entry into 
Auschwitz in January 1945. Littellﾒ’s choice of locations indicates his ambi-
tion, for these two spheres of activityﾗ—the killings by the Einsatzgruppen 
(mobile killing units) in the Soviet Union, and the system of the extermination 
camps in Polandﾗ—can be said to constitute the essence of the historical event 
we know as the Holocaust.
What I mean by ﾓ“the perpetrator as reliable historical witnessﾔ” can be 
made clear by a few examples. The   rst Aktion against the Jews that Aue 
witnesses takes place in a Ukrainian forest in July 1941. The text emphasizes 
that he is not one of the killers or one of those in charge: ﾓ“Janssen me proposa 
de venir assister à une actionﾔ” (Janssen suggested that I go to see an action) 
(81). Janssen is the commanding SS of  cer, while Aue is there to watch. The 
  ctional Aue, like the historical SS in the Einsatzgruppen, is a member of the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the security police arm of the SS, whose job was to 
follow the German Armyﾒ’s advance and eliminate ﾓ“dangerous elementsﾔ” like 
Jews and Communists; but Littell makes Aueﾒ’s job principally one of intel-
ligence gathering, so his activity consists largely in observing and writing 
reports. This does not exonerate him, of course, since he is a willing if some-
what passive participant in the mass murders, which he considers ﾓ“inévita-
13. The toccata, a piece of free improvisation, often preceded the actual dance movements in a 
suite. Here it corresponds to the narratorﾒ’s introduction and ﾓ“address to the readerﾔ” before he begins 
his account of events in World War II. Littell discusses the novelﾒ’s musical structure in his long 
conversation with the novelist Richard Millet (his editor at Gallimard), ﾓ“Conversation à Beyrouth,ﾔ” 
Le débat, March 2007, 9ﾖ–11.Susan Rubin Suleiman    7
bles et nécessairesﾔ” (inevitable and necessary) (82). And as he himself tells 
his sister much later, ﾓ“Je considère que regarder engage autant de respons-
abilité que faireﾔ” (I believe that looking involves as much responsibility as 
doing) (445). Nevertheless, by having Aue observe rather than command or 
do the killing, Littell places him at a small but crucial distance from what he 
describes.
What does Aue see in the forest? SS of  cers have rounded up a group of 
Jewish men and are ordering them to dig ditches into which they will be shot. 
At this point, only Jewish men were rounded up as ﾓ“dangerousﾔ”; a few weeks 
later, women and children would be as well. It is not easy to   nd a good spot 
for the ditches, partly because there are already other ditches full of corpses, 
presumably shot by the Bolsheviks. The scene becomes grotesquely comical, 
as well as horrifying, as those about to be executed and their executioners 
traipse around looking for a free spot, while the commanding of  cer sputters 
in frustration. The whole process, described at length by Aue, turns out to be 
improvised and ﾓ“amateurishﾔ”: blood and brains splatter all over; some people 
have to be shot twice; the ditches the victims   nally dig turn out to be full of 
water, so their bodies   oat rather than sink after they are shot. Aue describes 
all this, then comments:
Un tel amateurisme devint vite lﾒ’exception. Au   l des semaines, les of  -
ciers acquéraient de lﾒ’expérience, les soldats sﾒ’habituaient aux procédures; 
en même temps, on voyait bien que tous cherchaient leur place dans tout ça, 
ré  échissaient à ce qui se passait, chacun à sa manière. A table, le soir, les 
hommes discutaient des actions, se racontaient des anecdotes. . . . Certains 
réagissaient par la brutalité, parfois le sadisme. . . . Nos hommes, très sou-
vent, photographiaient les exécutions.
[Such amateurism soon became the exception. As the weeks went by, the 
of  cers gained more experience and the soldiers became used to the proce-
dures; at the same time, one could see that they all wondered about their 
place in all this and thought about what was going on, each in his own way. 
In the evening over dinner, the men talked about the ﾓ“actions,ﾔ” told anec-
dotes. . . . Some reacted with brutality, at times with sadism. . . . Very often, 
our men photographed the executions.] (88)
In this commentary, Aueﾒ’s role as a historical witness becomes fully 
apparent. The wide-angle description (ﾓ“some did this, others did thatﾔ”), as well 
as the reference to photographs being taken, is clearly based on retrospective 
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with History as memory,ﾔ” as Lanzmann puts it.14 Lanzmann   nds this a   aw 
in the novel, even though one could rationalize it on the grounds that Aue 
consulted many history books before writing his memoir, as he tells us in his 
introduction. But even Aueﾒ’s immediate reactions as he watches the shootings 
seem closer to those of a present-day observer than to someone on the spot. 
Looking at the Ukrainian auxiliaries ordered to do the shooting, he thinks to 
himself:
La plupart dﾒ’entre eux sﾒ’étaient battus contre les Polonais, puis contre les 
Soviétiques, ils devaient avoir rêvé dﾒ’un avenir meilleur, pour eux et pour 
leurs enfants, et voilà que maintenant ils se retrouvaient dans une forêt, 
portant un uniforme étranger et tuant des gens qui ne leur avaient rien fait, 
sans raison quﾒ’ils puissent comprendre. Que pouvaient-ils penser de cela? 
Pourtant, lorsquﾒ’on leur en donnait lﾒ’ordre, ils tiraient. . . . Que penseraient-
ils de tout cela plus tard?
[Most of them had fought against the Poles, then against the Soviets; they 
must have dreamed of a better future for themselves and their children, and 
here they were in a forest, wearing a foreign uniform and killing people who 
hadnﾒ’t done them any harm, for no reason they could comprehend. What 
could they be thinking about that? Yet, when they were given the order, they 
pulled the trigger. . . . What would they think of all that later?] (87)
This kind of re  ectionﾗ—together with the historical information contained 
in these few sentences about Ukrainians enrolled in the German army dur-
ing the invasion of Russia and used in the murder of Jewsﾗ—is clearly retro-
spective, even though it seems to be occurring at the moment; the use of free 
indirect discourse to report Aueﾒ’s thoughts marks a temporal and cognitive 
gap between the narrator and his former self. As some of the negative critics 
have pointed out, such ﾓ“clear-sightedﾔ” knowledge and re  ection lack verisi-
militude, even on the part of an intellectual member of the SS at that time. It 
is one example of what Lanzmann calls, very critically, the narratorﾒ’s ﾓ“ven-
triloquism of history books.ﾔ”15
Contrary to Lanzmann, I   nd this kind of disguised retrospection (or 
we could call it anachronistic narration) to be one of this novelﾒ’s greatest 
successes, and a highly original invention. Littell, in making his SS narrator 
into a reliable historical witnessﾗ—that is, one who functions as a witness 
14. Lanzmann, ﾓ“Lanzmann juge Les Bienveillantes.ﾔ”
15. Ibid.Susan Rubin Suleiman    9
informed by retrospective historical knowledgeﾗ—accomplishes something 
completely new. For here the historical truthﾗ—which includes not only the 
facts but also an attempt to grapple with their ethical and psychological 
implicationsﾗ—comes out of the mouth of one who was part of the very sys-
tem responsible for the horrors he is recounting, a system whose functioning 
he describes in detail. This procedure, which lacks plausibility historically, 
is extremely effective as   ction. Littellﾒ’s contemporary readers cannot sim-
ply read Aueﾒ’s narrative as an unmediated account; as I read, I am aware of 
the author behind the narrator and of the literary choices he is making. See-
ing things this way introduces a degree of ﾓ“derealizationﾔ” into the narrative, 
since we are aware of the authorﾒ’s manipulations, the way we might be aware 
of the cameraﾒ’s movements in a   lm. But I see this derealization as adding a 
metanarrative dimension to the novelﾒ’s realism, marking this novel as a post-
modern work rather than a classically realist one.
Lanzmann uses the idea of derealization in a different sense, as yet 
another   aw in this novel. According to him, Littell ﾓ“derealizesﾔ” the horrors 
he describes by rendering them in overwhelming detail; similarly, other critics 
accuse Littell of wallowing in these atrocities.16 But it is precisely the lei-
surely accumulation of details, including the killings and the killersﾒ’ thoughts 
and speculations, that distinguishes a novel from a work of history. Hilbergﾒ’s 
magnum opus, The Destruction of the European Jews, is a work of history that 
Littell cites as a major inspiration.17 But it is a different kind of writing. Lanz-
mann worries that readers might prefer Littellﾒ’s book to Hilbergﾒ’s. But if Lit-
tellﾒ’s account is a ﾓ“ventriloquism of history books,ﾔ” as Lanzmann also claims, 
his worry should be somewhat lessened. Nor can we assume that those who 
donﾒ’t read Littell will read Hilberg instead.
Consider Littellﾒ’s account of the massacre at Babi Yar. This event, which 
took place September 29ﾖ–30, 1941, in Kiev, has been memorialized in poetry 
and   ction (e.g., Yevgeny Yevtushenkoﾒ’s ﾓ“Babi Yar,ﾔ” D. M. Thomasﾒ’s White 
Hotel) as well as in history books. In Littellﾒ’s version, we get an extremely 
detailed account of the preparations for this ﾓ“Grosse Aktionﾔ” (large-scale 
action), where everything is thought out in advance: the method of execution, 
how the Jews would be taken to the ravine only after their possessions had 
been taken from them, and so on. All this is recounted as a series of practical 
problems solved by the of  cers in charge: Blobel, Jeckeln, and others, most 
of them historical   gures (Paul Blobel and Friedrich Jeckeln were tried and 
16. Ibid.
17. Garcin, ﾓ“Littell est grand,ﾔ” 50.10    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
executed after the war). These men are shown worrying about the smooth func-
tioning of the operation without asking themselves any other questions. More-
over, in this instance Aue must also narrate his own participation in the Aktion, 
for he is ordered to descend into the ravine and   nish off those still alive after 
the mass shooting: ﾓ“Pour atteindre certains blessés, il fallait marcher sur les 
corps, cela glissait affreusement, les chairs blanches et molles roulaient sous 
mes bottes. . . . je mﾒ’enfonçais jusquﾒ’aux chevilles dans la boue et le sang. 
Cﾒ’était horribleﾔ” (To reach some of the wounded, one had to walk on the bod-
ies, it was terribly slippery and the soft white   esh of the corpses rolled beneath 
my boots. . . . I sank up to my ankles in mud and blood. It was horrible) (125). 
One could see here an example of Littellﾒ’s fondness for gore, but I think it is an 
example of the difference between   ction and history. A novel can allow itself, 
must allow itself, such detail if it is describing what happened at Babi Yar, 
where more than thirty thousand Jews were murdered in two daysﾗ—and it is all 
the more striking when these details are recounted in the   rst person, by one of 
the murderers.
To be sure, Aue is not an ordinary murderer. After the narration, we have 
his re  ectionsﾗ—again quite ﾓ“invraisemblablesﾔ” (unrealistic), and again neces-
sary for Littellﾒ’s project:
Même les boucheries démentielles de la Grande Guerre . . . paraissaient 
presque propres et justes à côté de ce que nous avions amené au monde. Je 
trouvais cela extraordinaire. . . . Notre système, notre Etat, se moquait pro-
fondément des pensées de ses serviteurs. Cela lui était indifférent que lﾒ’on tue 
les Juifs parce quﾒ’on les haïssait ou parce quﾒ’on voulait faire avancer sa car-
rière ou même, dans certaines limites, parce quﾒ’on y prenait du plaisir. . . . 
Cela lui était même indifférent, au fond, que lﾒ’on refuse de les tuer, aucune 
sanction ne serait prise, car il savait bien que le réservoir des tueurs disponibles 
étaient sans fond.
[Even the demented butchery of the Great War . . . seemed almost clean 
and just next to what we had brought into the world. I found that extraordi-
nary. . . . Our system, our state, didnﾒ’t give a damn about the thoughts of its 
servants. It didnﾒ’t care whether they killed Jews because they hated them or 
because they wanted to advance their careers or even, within certain limits, 
because it gave them pleasure. . . . It didnﾒ’t even care, really, if some refused 
to kill them, they wouldnﾒ’t be punished, for the system knew full well that 
the reservoir of available killers was bottomless.] (127)
This is a reality observed through the later analyses of Hannah Arendt on 
totalitarian systems or Christopher Browning on the role of ﾓ“ordinary menﾔ” Susan Rubin Suleiman    11
in mass murder. And it is made,   ctively, by an SS of  cer who was in the 
ravine shooting people a few hours earlier. Unrealistic, no doubt, but power-
ful, and pointing not only to historical facts but to their ethical and moral 
implications.
The Perpetrator as Moral Witness
The minute one begins to re  ect on the history of mass murder, one is neces-
sarily drawn to ethical and moral questions: not so much why it happened 
but how it was possible for human beings to do this. In Les bienveillantes, 
questions about such moral implications arise when Aue speaks with other 
intellectuals involved in the killings. Littellﾒ’s handling of these one-on-one 
conversations brings to mind André Malrauxﾒ’s novels, in which intellectual 
talk is a constant accompaniment to action. Like Malraux, Littell maintains 
extraordinarily rich exchanges of ideas in truly dialogical fashion, and many 
of these conversations revolve around ﾓ“the Jewish question.ﾔ”
These conversations (including a memorable one between Aue and Otto 
Ohlendorf, another historical   gure executed after the war, who calls the mur-
der of Jews ﾓ“une erreur . . . Mais une erreur nécessaireﾔ” [a mistake . . . But a 
necessary mistake] [208]) occur throughout the novel; but they are especially 
frequent in the ﾓ“Menuetﾔ” chapter. Just as the moral and historical center of the 
ﾓ“Allemandesﾔ” chapter is the Einsatzgruppen killings, the moral center of the 
ﾓ“Menuetﾔ” chapter is the camps. Here, too, Aue is an observer, but whereas in 
the Ukraine he had to participate actively in the killing, now he has a job that 
places him in tension with the killing mission, since he is charged with   nd-
ing able-bodied prisoners for slave labor. Littell makes use here of a historical 
con  ict in the SS ranks between those who (like Adolf Eichmann) wanted 
above all to ﾓ“liquidateﾔ” the Jews and those (including, eventually, Himmler 
himself) who wanted to exploit able-bodied Jewish prisoners for the war effort 
before they became too weak to work. So the question was not whether these 
prisoners would die but simply when. Paradoxically, even though Aue remains 
in total complicity with the system, in his new job he is directed, by the system 
itself, to seek ways of ﾓ“sparingﾔ” some Jewish prisoners from too harsh a treat-
ment. This twist allows Littell to show Aue as being appalled and indignant at 
the treatment of the prisoners in Auschwitz without having to show the slight-
est sympathy for them as human beings (they are simply potentially useful 
labor) and without abandoning his Nazi allegiance. Moreover, as part of his 
job he has to have all the documentation on the camps, with several visits to 
see for himself how they functionﾗ—whence his own continuing role as a reli-
able historical witness.12    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
But here more than ever, Aueﾒ’s historical witnessing involves moral 
questions. Aue himself expresses shock when he   rst reads the statistics about 
the death rate in Auschwitz (this is the   rst time he hears of Auschwitz): ﾓ“[Ces 
chiffres], je dois lﾒ’avouer, mﾒ’épouvantèrentﾔ” ([These numbers], I must confess, 
horri  ed me) (504). He decides to consult his constant friend Thomas Hauser, 
a kind of ﾓ“doubleﾔ” who   nds himself wherever Aue does. Hauser, a very clever, 
egotistical, totally amoral member of the SD, responds in a way that high-
lights his difference from Aue:
Il est remarquable à quel point les gens sont bien informés des prétendus 
secrets, le programme dﾒ’euthanasie, la destruction des Juifs, les camps de 
Pologne, le gaz, tout. . . . Mais ce qui est encourageant, cﾒ’est que malgré 
tout les gens continuent à soutenir le Parti et les autorités, ils ont toujours 
foi en notre Führer. . . . Ce qui démontre quoi? Qu[e] . . . lﾒ’esprit national-
socialiste est devenue la vérité de la vie quotidienne du Volk.
[Itﾒ’s striking how much people know about the so-called secrets, the eutha-
nasia program, the destruction of the Jews, the camps in Poland, the gas, 
everything. . . . But whatﾒ’s encouraging is that despite all that people con-
tinue to support the Party and the authorities, they still have faith in our 
Führer. . . . Which proves what? [That] . . . the National Socialist spirit has 
become the truth of the everyday life of the Volk.] (505ﾖ–6)
Hauserﾒ’s discourse here is a straight expression of Nazi fanaticism, with-
out the least hint of moral scruple or even moral questioning; it also allows 
Littell to drive home the historical thesis that ﾓ“ordinaryﾔ” Germans knew 
far more than they later admitted about the fate of the Jews. Aue is far less 
straight than Hauser in his Nazi beliefs, even while remaining entirely within 
the system.
One apparent exception to the above is Aueﾒ’s ﾓ“fanaticalﾔ” declaration 
about ethics in a conversation with Eichmann. When Eichmann, quite con-
trary to type, asks him whether Immanuel Kantﾒ’s categorical imperative 
applies in wartime (after all, he says, we wouldnﾒ’t want our enemies to do to us 
what weﾒ’re doing to them!), Aue replies that there is no problem as long as one 
ﾓ“rewritesﾔ” Kantﾒ’s imperative as follows: ﾓ“Agissez de manière que le Führer, 
sﾒ’il connaissait votre action, lﾒ’approuverait.18 Il nﾒ’y a aucune contradiction 
entre ce principe et lﾒ’Impératif de Kantﾔ” (Act in such a way that the Führer, if 
18. Aue attributes this saying to Dr. Hans Frank, a jurist whom Hitler appointed governor-
general of Poland; he was condemned to death at Nuremberg and hanged in 1948.Susan Rubin Suleiman    13
he knew about your action, would approve of it. There is no contradiction 
between this principle and Kantﾒ’s Imperative) (523). Eichmann seems satis  ed, 
but a few pages later Aue remarks: ﾓ“Et lﾒ’impératif kantien? A vrai dire je nﾒ’en 
savais trop rien, jﾒ’avais raconté un peu nﾒ’importe quoi à ce pauvre Eichmann. 
En Ukraine ou en Caucase, des questions de cet ordre me concernaient encore, 
je mﾒ’af  igeais des dif  cultés et en discutais avec sérieux. . . . Mais ce senti-
ment semblait sﾒ’être perdu. . . . le sentiment qui me dominait à présent était une 
vaste indifférenceﾔ” (And the Kantian imperative? To tell the truth, I knew 
nothing about it, I had said pretty much what came into my head to poor Eich-
mann. In the Ukraine and in the Caucasus, I was still concerned with such 
questions, I was disturbed by their dif  culty and discussed them seriously. . . . 
But that feeling seemed to have gotten lost. . . . my predominant feeling at 
present was one of enormous indifference) (525ﾖ–26). Despite his claim to 
indifference, however, Aue continues at this point to re  ect and question him-
self. On his visit to Sobibor, he meets a perfectly ordinary fellow who has been 
gassing people ever since he was assigned to the euthanasia program in the 
late 1930s. Later this fellow was sent to Kharkov, where German soldiers who 
were too badly wounded were gassed in trucks. Compared with that, he says, 
Sobibor is easier. This meeting provokes a lengthy re  ection by Aue, on 
whether what the Nazis did was ﾓ“inhumanﾔ”:
On a beaucoup parlé, après la guerre, pour essayer dﾒ’expliquer ce qui sﾒ’était 
passé, de lﾒ’inhumain. Mais lﾒ’inhumain, excusez-moi, cela nﾒ’existe pas. Il nﾒ’y 
a que de lﾒ’humain et encore de lﾒ’humain: et ce Döll en est un bon exemple. 
Quﾒ’est-ce que cﾒ’est dﾒ’autre, Döll, quﾒ’un bon père de famille qui voulait nour-
rir ses enfants, et qui obéissait à son gouvernement même si en son for inté-
rieur il nﾒ’était pas tout à fait dﾒ’accord?
[After the war, to try and explain what happened, people talked a lot about 
the inhuman. But excuse me, the inhuman doesnﾒ’t exist. There is only the 
human and more human: and this Döll is a good example of it. What is Döll, 
if not a good family man who wanted to feed his children, and who obeyed 
his government even if deep down he didnﾒ’t completely agree?] (543)
Then he evokes the Americans and the British, who also committed their share 
of atrocities in their time and place. One could see this as an example of the 
Nazi tactic of self-justi  cation by smearing the other. But because this is just a 
small part of what Aue tells us in this book, and since the great mass of what 
he tells us is his witnessing of German crimes, his accusation of the Ameri-
cans and the Britishﾗ—and implicitly of ﾓ“vous,ﾔ” the readerﾗ—has more force.14    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
What also has extraordinary force are some of Aueﾒ’s conversations with 
other ﾓ“thoughtfulﾔ” Nazis, such as Eduard Wirths, the chief doctor at Auschwitz. 
Littell has Wirths expressing distress at the fact that many guards become 
sadists in the camp; a few pages later, he offers an explanation that may strike 
readers as improbable, coming from this Nazi doctor:
Jﾒ’en suis arrivé à la conclusion que le garde SS ne devient pas violent ou 
sadique parce quﾒ’il pense que le détenu nﾒ’est pas un être humain; au contraire, 
sa rage croît et tourne au sadisme lorsquﾒ’il sﾒ’aperçoit que le détenu, loin dﾒ’être 
un sous-homme comme on le lui a appris, est justement, après tout, un homme, 
comme lui au fond, et cﾒ’est cette résistance, vous voyez, que le garde trouve 
insupportable, cette persistance muette de lﾒ’autre, et donc le garde le frappe 
pour essayer de faire disparaître leur humanité commune.
[I have come to the conclusion that the SS guard does not become violent or 
sadistic because he thinks that the prisoner is not human; on the contrary, 
his rage increases and turns sadistic when he realizes that the prisoner, far 
from being a subhuman as he was told, is precisely, after all, a man like him-
self, and itﾒ’s that resistance, you see, that the guard   nds unbearable, the 
otherﾒ’s mute resistance, and so the guard beats him to try and eradicate their 
common humanity.] (575)
This insight, which contradicts Nazi doctrine about the victimsﾒ’ lack of human-
ity and af  rms instead the victimsﾒ’ ﾓ“mute resistanceﾔ” as human beings, strikes 
one as more likely to be found in the pages of Lﾒ’espèce humaine (The Human 
Species), Robert Antelmeﾒ’s philosophical memoir on his camp experiences, 
than in the mouth of a man who has gone down in history as one of those 
responsible for the deaths of several million people in the gas chambers.19 We 
could see Littellﾒ’s maneuver here as a kind of ironic last laugh, making a very 
unlikely personage the source of a philosophical truth, or Littell could be 
making use here of Wirthsﾒ’s reputation as a ﾓ“humaneﾔ” doctor, despite his hor-
ri  c role in Auschwitz. In either case, the truth of Wirthsﾒ’s insight gains even 
more weight coming from him. In a way, we could see Wirths as a historical 
counterpart to the   ctional Aue: a Nazi ideologue who never refused to obey 
the system but nevertheless retained a certain humanity and moral sense.
19. Wirths was responsible for the medical selections of prisoners for extermination and also 
oversaw numerous experiments on prisoners; at the same time, he has been described as a man of 
conscience, terribly con  icted about his role in Auschwitz. Imprisoned after the war, he committed 
suicide while awaiting trial. For a full discussion, see Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medi-
cal Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986), chap. 18.Susan Rubin Suleiman    15
ﾓ“Yes, but,ﾔ” one could ask, ﾓ“doesnﾒ’t this make the   ctionalized Wirths 
in Littellﾒ’s novel appear troublingly appealing?ﾔ” Probably it does. And the 
same ﾓ“appealingﾔ” quality exists in the   ctional Aue as well. That is the price 
Littell pays (and the reader pays?) for using Aue as a moral witness. It is as if 
one cannot have it both ways: either Aue must be totally fanatic and amoral 
(not inhuman, just fanatic and amoral, like his friend Hauser) but then unable 
to engage in re  ections that carry moral weight, or he is at least a partly reli-
able moral witnessﾗ—despite himself, as it wereﾗ—concerning Nazi atrocities, 
but then he cannot be totally fanatic and amoral. The choice to accord him 
a certain degree of moral awareness is similar to Littellﾒ’s earlier choice to 
entrust him with the telling of historical truth.
At some moments, Aueﾒ’s tone is coldly analytic, as if he were a critical 
but detached observer of the Nazi machine. He comments, for example, on the 
Nazi bureaucracyﾒ’s use of language, especially the Nazisﾒ’ preference for pas-
sive constructions: ﾓ“Ainsi les choses se faisaient toute seules, personne ne 
faisait jamais rien, personne nﾒ’agissait, cﾒ’étaient des actes sans acteursﾔ” (Thus 
things got done all by themselves, no one ever did anything, no one acted, 
these were actions without agents) (581). Or there is his lengthy commentary, 
very much inspired by Arendt and other historians and philosophers, on why 
the Nazis ﾓ“obstinatelyﾔ” sought to exterminate the Jews of Hungary as late as 
1944, when by purely rational calculations they should have expended their 
energies elsewhere (717ﾖ–19). At other times, his comments become more 
subjective. In one sequence, he accompanies Albert Speer on a hunt (without 
carry  ing a gun himself, because he does not like to kill, he says), and while 
they are walking through the woods, he is beset by unpleasant memories 
despite the beauty of the place: ﾓ“Une bouffée dﾒ’amertume mﾒ’envahit: Voilà ce 
quﾒ’ils ont fait de moi, me disais-je, un homme qui ne peut voir une forêt sans 
songer à une fosse communeﾔ” (A wave of bitterness washed over me: Here is 
what theyﾒ’ve made of me, I said to myself, a man who canﾒ’t see a forest without 
thinking of a mass grave) (645). This is a rare moment when Aue seems to 
set himself against the system, against ﾓ“them,ﾔ” as indicated by the contrasting 
pronouns (ﾓ“ils ont fait de moiﾔ”). Everywhere else, whatever historical or moral 
distance from the system he may manifest exists simultaneously with his 
unconditional allegiance to it.
This structure of simultaneous belonging and distance, so that Aue is at 
once wholly within the Nazi system and suf  ciently outside it to see it for what 
it is, both historically and morally, is what de  nes his particular status as a 
perpetrator-witness. I believe that it is Littellﾒ’s major achievement in this novel. 16    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
And it is a literary achievement, for Aue is hard to imagine as an actual person; 
he is even hard to imagine as a ﾓ“believableﾔ” character in realist   ction.20
As it happens, the structure of simultaneous but contradictory states that 
characterizes Aue as narrator also de  nes the psychological phenomenon 
of dissociation or splitting, whereby one part of the psyche ﾓ“knowsﾔ” something 
that another part denies. And that brings me to what I earlier referred to as a 
problematic aspect of Littellﾒ’s book.
The Perpetrator as Incestuous Matricide?
Interspersed with Aueﾒ’s historical and moral witnessing is Aueﾒ’s personal his-
tory, told and recalled in fragments. The son of a German father who fought in 
World War I and later abandoned his family, and an Alsatian French mother 
who took up with a Frenchman after her husbandﾒ’s disappearance, Aue grows 
up as a ﾓ“disturbedﾔ” adolescent. He cuts off all contact with his family after 
around age twenty and chooses to live in Germany as a sign of allegiance to 
his father; furthermore, he is in love with his twin sister and has had incestuous 
relations with her; and   nally, while on a convalescence leave after receiving 
a serious head wound at Stalingrad, he murders his stepfather with an ax and 
strangles his mother. He has absolutely no memory of these acts and never 
acknowledges them.
Here, then, is the problem: what does this private story straight out of 
Aeschylus, but with a good modern dose of erotic transgression à la Georges 
Bataille, do to the public history of war and genocide that Aue is assigned to 
narrate and analyze? Littell has explained in interviews that he felt he really 
ﾓ“hadﾔ” the book when he got the idea of drawing on the Oresteia for its plot 
structure.21 Although Aueﾒ’s personal history occupies far fewer pages than 
those devoted to the war and the genocide, the importance of the Oresteia plot 
20. This may seem to contradict my earlier comment on the Nazi doctor Wirthsﾒ’s con  icted 
feelings about his actions, but Aue is far more explicit and proli  c in his analyses and his moral wit-
nessing than Wirths ever was (at least according to what is known about him), so in fact the com-
parison con  rms Aueﾒ’s   ctional status. If the historical Wirths was con  icted about his role as the 
chief of a killing factory, that is a far cry from Aueﾒ’s (or rather Littellﾒ’s) work of witnessing and 
analysis in this novel.
21. See, e.g., the interview with Florent Georgesco in La revue littéraire, no. 28 (2006), rpt. as 
ﾓ“Jonathan Littell: ﾑ‘Maximilien Aue, je pourrais dire que cﾒ’est moi,ﾒ’ﾔ” Le Figaro Magazine, Decem-
ber 30, 2006, 48ﾖ–52. Florence Mercier-Leca makes a strong case for the use of the Greek myth in 
the novel, as one of many texts that constitute its intertextual web, in ﾓ“Les Bienveillantes et la tra-
gédie grecque: Une suite macabre à Lﾒ’Orestie dﾒ’Eschyle,ﾔ” Le débat, March 2007, 45ﾖ–55. While I 
am persuaded by her general argument, I still   nd the coexistence of the ﾓ“privateﾔ” plot with the 
historical account problematicﾗ—or at least, problematic enough to be examined critically.Susan Rubin Suleiman    17
22. Mercier-Leca suggests that the novel casts doubt on whether Aue actually did commit the 
murder (ﾓ“Les Bienveillantes et la tragédie grecque,ﾔ” 49ﾖ–50), but the case made by the detectives 
seems airtight, since Aueﾒ’s bloody clothes are found in the bathtub of the house where the murder 
is committed. Is Littell playing here with the whole question of the reliability of evidence and the 
reconstruction of historical fact? Whether he is or not, I think it would actually weaken the private 
plot if the reader doubted that Aue had committed the murder. It would also weaken the historical 
narrative by casting doubt on the possibility of ever reconstructing a veridical account of the past.
is indicated by the novelﾒ’s title (Les bienveillantes is a literal translation of 
Eumenides, the euphemistic name assigned to the Furies after they have been 
molli  ed). Signi  cantly, this word also appears in the novelﾒ’s last sentence: 
ﾓ“Les bienveillantes avaient retrouvé ma traceﾔ” (The kindly ones had picked up 
my trail) (894).
Let me brie  y indicate the questions that bother me. On the one hand, 
there is the problem of the ﾓ“memory hole.ﾔ” Aue, who remembers the tiniest 
details of what he felt and saw and said to others in the forests of the Ukraine, 
in Stalingrad under siege, in Berlin under Allied bombing, or as he stood on 
the arrival platform at Auschwitz, remembers absolutely nothing of the mur-
ders he committed in his motherﾒ’s house in Antibes. His gruesome double 
killing is accomplished in the ellipsis between two sentences: ﾓ“Je me cou-
chai et mﾒ’endormis. Lorsque je me réveillai la lumière avait changé, il fai-
sait très sombreﾔ” (I lay down and went to sleep. When I awoke, the light 
had changed, it was very dark) (487). When he discovers the two bodies, 
his reaction is one of horror and anguish: ﾓ“On lﾒ’a étranglée, on a étranglé ma 
mère. . . . Lﾒ’assassin avait dû dﾒ’abord tuer Moreau, puis monterﾔ” (She was 
strangled, my mother was strangled. . . . The killer must have killed Moreau 
  rst, then gone upstairs) (489). This is a textbook case of dissociation, very 
well done by Littell. Right to the end, Aue never ﾓ“remembersﾔ” the action he 
committed; it is the two somewhat comical detectives, Weser and Clemens, 
who   gure it out, by the usual methods of evidence gathering and deductionﾗ—
methods similar to those of the historian, incidentally.22 But if Aue himself 
never recalls his act, how can we grant himﾗ—even   ctivelyﾗ—the ability to 
recall and reliably report on the events in Kiev, Stalingrad, and other cities? 
Does his private memory hole undermine the project of historical witnessing 
that is the novelﾒ’s major achievement?
On the other hand, for Aue to continue with his life after the killing as if 
nothing has happened (which he does here) and to have a memory of his act 
would be an even greater undermining of the historical project. For if he con-
tinued to function in the full knowledge of what he had done, he would have 
to be truly monstrous, and that in turn would destroy his status (however 18    Perpetrator Becomes a Reliable Witness
23. Interestingly, several years before publishing Les bienveillantes, Littell wrote a short book 
in which he did a close reading of a work by the Belgian fascist leader Léon Degrelle, who fought 
on the German side on the Russian front and survived to tell the tale (Le sec et lﾒ’humide: Une brève 
incursion en territoire fasciste [Paris: Gallimard, 2008]). Littell explains that he was seeking to 
ﾓ“testﾔ” on Degrelle the theoretical model of the ﾓ“male soldierﾔ” proposed by Klaus Theweleit, in his 
important book Männerphantasien (Male Fantasies) (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Roter Stern, 
1977), which was based on the writings of an earlier generation of German soldiers, members of 
the Freikorps after World War I. Although Littell did not strictly retain Theweleitﾒ’s model (which 
emphasizes the fascist hatred of the female body and of all that is ﾓ“softﾔ” or ﾓ“humidﾔ”) in construct-
ing the   gure of Aue, he was obviously in  uenced by Theweleitﾒ’s notion that fascism had to be envis-
aged in ﾓ“corporalﾔ” terms as much as in terms of adherence to an ideology. Signi  cantly, he makes 
Aueﾒ’s father a member of the Freikorps.
problematic it may appear even now to some readers) as a historical and 
moral witness. By having Aueﾗ—at least the conscious, narrating Aueﾗ—remain 
dissociated from his act to the very end, Littell can preserve him as a reliable 
witness to the Holocaust, even while his memory hole about the family mur-
der demonstrates the human ability to block out unbearable actions.
This could, then, be a plausible literary justi  cation for the memory 
hole. However, there is another question: why did Littell, as novelist, feel it 
necessary to have his protagonist commit such a heinous act in the   rst place? 
Aue is, willy-nilly, a representative   gureﾗ—one of the many German intellec-
tuals who willingly participated in the Nazi machinery of destruction. His 
intelligence, his self-questioning, and above all his pitiless detailing of the 
machinery in which he was involved make of him an exemplary   gure, even 
if one lacking in verisimilitude; as I have tried to show, that lack is a strength 
of the novel, not a weakness. But what do Aueﾒ’s incest and matricide do to his 
exemplariness? Is Littell suggesting that all, or at least many, intellectuals who 
joined the SS had some grave family dysfunction to explain their behavior?23 
Or is Aueﾒ’s small but crucial critical distance from the system he describes 
due, at least in part, to his sexual oddity, so that his absence of ﾓ“straightﾔ” Nazi 
fanaticism is mirrored by a similarly ﾓ“nonstraightﾔ” sexuality? But even if that 
is the case, doesnﾒ’t the very extremeness of Aueﾒ’s family story take away from 
his authority as a witness to the Holocaust?
I am still struggling with these questions. It occurs to me, however, that 
one could read the two storiesﾗ—the public history and the family tragedyﾗ—in 
counterpoint, without looking for causal connections between them. The two 
stories would then be related metaphorically, not logically or psychologically 
in terms of cause and effect. The metaphorical equivalence would hinge on 
the question of guilt and responsibility. Although Aue claims from the start 
that he feels no remorse for his wartime activities, the novelﾒ’s last sentence Susan Rubin Suleiman    19
24. See ﾓ“Jonathan Littell: ﾑ‘Maximilien Aue, je pourrais dire que cﾒ’est moi.ﾒ’ﾔ”
(ﾓ“Les bienveillantes avaient retrouvé ma traceﾔ”) suggests that he continues to 
be pursued by the Furies for his matricide. Littell has explained in interviews 
that what he likes about Greek tragedy is its attitude toward guilt and respon-
sibility: it does not matter whether the one who commits a crime intended it, 
or remembers it, or even knew what he or she was doing. Oedipus murdered 
his father and married his mother, in full ignoranceﾗ—yet he is judged guilty, 
by himself as well as others.24 The family plot in Les bienveillantes is there, 
perhaps, to remind us that it is the action that de  nes guilt in crimes against 
humanity, not the intention behind it: all those who participated in the Nazi 
system of extermination were guilty of the crimes it committed, independently 
of intention, and even of memory.